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FRENCH OPINION OF OUR CIVIL WAR
In these days when America is the spectator of world war, it
is of increased interest to notice the views of Europe when
America was the battle ground itself. An awakening interest in
this study has recently impressed upon our public the paramount
importance of the English attitude toward the war; and our
vast debt to Cobden, Bright, and John Stuart Mill and other
English Liberals has stirred the national gratitude. The Liberals
of France played an equal role. Their voice, not loud but deep,
operated to curb the opportunism and militancy of Napoleon
III and his cabinet of adventurers. The spirit of liberalism was
abroad in the world, and Europeans instinctively recognized
the Unionists as champions of a common cause wherein all lovers
of humanity claimed a stake.
The nineteenth century witnessed the popularizing of liberalism. Only the Titans of the eighteenth century had burst the
chains wherewith bigotry had held the world enslaved. In an
age of "enlightened despots" the masses had remained in outer
darkness. It was not till the nineteenth century that the first
fruits of emancipation were garnered into a new social consciousness. The philosophy of voices crying in the wilderness had
become the practical creed of the average man. The common
man was to animate, if not to dominate, the nineteenth century,
and with his newly awakened instincts of democracy, he clung
to liberalism. The attitude of the toiler, were he English, or
were he French, was to be a most unwonted and astonishing
factor in governmental policy. Whether blind or intelligent, this
attitude was instinctively liberal.
From the outset, the new spirit pervaded the French attitude
toward the American Civil War. But the intense conservatism
of the French character, the prestige of the Empire fresh from its
laurels in Italy, the recrudescent popularity of the Orleanists,
and the presence of the Roman Church, far more weighty in the
councils of the Second Empire than in those of the Third Republic, created a complex of forces all of which influenced, no
one of which wholly dominated, national policy. The following
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notes may serve as a sort of parallelogram of those forces which
guided the American diplomacy of Napoleon III.
The aristocracy of the Faubourg St. Germain may be said to
have favoured the Union. The action of the Comte de Paris and
the Prince de J oinville in serving with McClellan carried with it
the loyalty of the Orleanist party, and drawing-room gossip
credited them with more than mere sabre assistance to Lincoln's
government.
The Prince de Joinville was declared to have
swung the balance in favour of surrendering Mason and Slidell
to the demands of England, an inestimable service if true. The
Princes' military service had a diplomatic importance because
the more their popularity increased in France, the more hostile
became Napoleon's government toward the side which they
espoused. In carrying out the traditions of La Fayette and
Rochambeau, the Orleans Princes won a deserved respect both
in America and at home; but the Cabinet at Washington recognized the peril of antagonizing Napoleon, and the return of the
Princes to Europe was more a relief than a regret. The rising
tide of Orleanism was a menace against which Napoleon always
stood guard, and his official press relaxed in anti-Union bitterness
the moment the Princes withdrew. The Princes were well
advised; for their position would have been awkward in the not
impossible event of war between the United States and France,
had they retained their commissions till its outbreak. Within
the Federal lines or in the great world of Europe, it remained
true of the Comte de Paris that "a more loyal and ardent
American does not exist than this King's son."
In as far as popular sentiment could restrain an autocrat,
the neutrality of France was due to Liberals. A true instinct
told them that popular government was facing its supreme test
and that its future in Europe depended upon its success in
America. The Liberals were capable of sacrifices for an ideal,
and their sympathy, which the South had hoped to win by its
free-trade theory, was faithful to the enemies of slavery. Overlook as he might the mote of Northern tariff, no Liberal could
ignore the beam of Southern slavery. Le Pays alone of all the
Paris papers dared to come out unequivocally for the South. Not
even Le Moniteur and the government-inspired press could defy
the Frenchman's inborn, inbred hatred for slavery. The great
reviews, La Revue des Deux M ondes and La Revue Contemporaine,
were unfailing in their denunciation of the" peculiar institution."
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But most clarion of the literary notes was the ringing testimony
of Agenor de Gasparin, the greatest advocate of human rights
then living in France, a prophet who dared to rebuke the sins of
his people and whose faith in "la Justice ne peut mal faire" is ever
marching to fulfilment .
.If Liberal efforts had been confined to literature, Napoleon
might have snapped his fingers at academic theories, but they
were not. The years of the Civil War were marked by constantly
decreasing government majorities in the Corps Legislatif. The
Liberal campaign of 1863, Napoleon's last opportunity for
plausible interference in America, was particularly energetic with
such intellectual giants as Jules Favre, Emile Ollivier, Thiers, and
Montalembert for leaders. In 1857 the combined opposition
parties had seated only five deputies; in 1863 they named thirtyfive. Even more significant was the popular vote. An opposition
of 571,000 in 18S7 had grown to 1,900,000 in 1863. In the face of
Thiers's threat that the people might take their liberties if government continued to deny them, Napoleon ran too great a risk if he
were to shock the deepest instincts of his people by pro-slavery
aggression.
According to the more advanced Liberal thought, Napoleon
had done quite enough injury to humanity by not coming out
boldly in 1861 with the assurance that he would never recognize
the existence of a people the cornerstone of whose liberty was
slavery. That is the doctrine of Paul Boiteau in a very able
article, defining slavery as a fundamental issue-states-rights,
racial antipathies, even the tariff being empty pretexts. The
longer the war continued, he pointed out, the more complete
would be the ruin of slavery and of a revolt which was" the most
impudent and most odious insult which has ever been cast upon
modern ideas of civilization. "
The sincerity of French Liberals is the more convincing
because they were well aware of the strange blindness of the
American public which persistently refused to see the real Napoleon and which openly sympathized with him in his conflict
with the best friends we had, the intellectual and moral lights of
France. They followed our military conquests with admiration.
Their enthusiasm was for our moral victories. No characteristic
of the war impressed them more than the dominance of the civil
over the military authority; no single incident more than the
reprimand to General Sherman for exceeding his instructions in
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offering terms to the enemy. In the hour of victory these men
of ideals wrought for mercy, and while forty thousand of them
were subscribing toward a Lincoln Memorial~ their leaders were
pleading with President Johnson to "be generous in victory . . .
May his [Lincoln's] be the last blood shed." Our debt to these
men of thought and men of action is past computing. Our
existence as a nation depended upon the self-restraint of Europe,
and Europe met the crisis.
One great cause for an increase in the Liberal vote was the
discontent of the working classes who had enjoyed too small a
sharein the expansion of wealth in the decade before 1860. The
conflict of interest with their employers had shown the workingmen that their advantage lay in free trade, and in this policy
Napoleon had their support as well as that of Liberal leaders.
Now it is inconceivable that these workers who understood their
own interests so intelligently in the matter of the tariff should
have failed to comprehend even more clearly the vital necessity
of a free and normal supply of cotton for the enormous spinning
industry which flourished about Rouen. Equally patent, if
prosperity were to continue, was the necessity of an American
market for French goods. Even in April, 1861, St. Etienne was
starving because the American market for silk was dead. The
Morrill tariff laid a crushing burden upon the wine and distilling
interests. Before the war was two years old, the suffering in
the cotton-spinning centres of Nantes, Cholet, Clisson, and
Rouen was pitiful, worse even than in the Manchester district
because French relief methods were less efficient than English.
Somewhat later, the misery was so great that no French newspaper would have been permitted to describe it. In face of such
widespread distress one would look for ardent labour support for
a Napoleonic programme of intervention which should put an
end to the American war and restore the equilibrium of the market. Why then was this support lacking or so negligible as not to
warrant Napoleon in his project? For one thing, labour was less
articulate than now. No united federation proclaimed its will
and dictated to governors and congresses. For another, labour
sentiment was far from a unit. While the coarse cottons of the
North were shut down and famine stalked abroad, the fine
cottons of Lille employing more hands and less raw material were
abundantly prosperous with 1,200,000 spindles in full operation.
A sudden peace would throw two million bales of cotton upon the
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market to the complete demoralization of the industry. Besides,
peace enforced bya foreign bayonet,or peace based on separation,
would be of short duration. Moreover, labour which had resented the Government's act in 1860 of raising the price of tobacco
twenty-five per cent. had no reason for the sublimest confidence
in Napoleon's schemes for its welfare. Practical men might
approve his Mexican plan as a readier source for raw cotton than
tampering with the Confederacy. Idealists could not brook
Government's interference with a nation of freemen beyond the
Atlantic. Labour ignorant and inarticulate could sway the
Government no more than so many peasants who always voted
a straight ticket. Labour intelligent and progressive felt with
the thinkers of the Liberal party that it was a question of humanityand that the sufferer in a cotton famine was doing his
part in the great cotton war of freedom against slavery.
The attitude of the money barons was in contrast to that of
labour. The Rothschilds were known to be favourable to the
South, and it is not beyond probability that the archives of the
Belmont family, their New York representatives, may yet shed
much light upon the financial mainsprings of the war, South as
well as North. The Confederate Cotton Loan of r863 brought
out by the Erlangers was not offered in Germany, where public
sentiment ran very high against it; and in England and France,
where it was over-subscribed, its apologists declared it was only
to pay past debts and not to furnish new sinews of war. This
was wise bolstering of Southern credit, which had not gained in
Europe by Jefferson Davis's supposed share in Mississippi Repudiation, by the cancellation of Northern ownership in Southern
banks and railroads, and by the general repudiation of Southern
debts to Northern creditors. The £3,000,000 was floated at the
right time. Paying seven per cent. and secured on the precious
commodity, cotton, the bonds found a ready sale. Men looked
to blockade runners to bring the cotton to market. and to General
Lee's sword to make good the bonds. They at one time scored
a premium, and even after Appomattox were not without a
market.
In Catholic France the Church was bound to be a prime
factor in moulding opinion. In this connection, Protestants may
safely be dismissed as practically to a unit Liberal and pro-Union.
Within the ancient Church, a distinct line of cleavage existed.
The Liberal party included many of the most distinguished laity
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in France, such men as Augustin Cochin and the Comte de
Montalembert being found within its ranks. But UpOIl the admission of Roman Catholics themselves, the hierarchy, the
Church as an institution, lent its great authority on behalf of the
South. Thus the new Archbishop of Paris, in the first public
address after his elevation, attacked England and Russia for
their refusal to join Napoleon in mediation, an act which would
have been most prejudicial to the Union. Similarly, the Archbishop of Rouen blamed the shortage of cotton to England's
refusal to join the Emperor in recognizing the South and breaking
the blockade.
Pius IX himself wrote to Jefferson Davis
saluting him as "Illustrious and Honourable Sir, greeting:" and
rejoicing in his" desire for peace and tranquillity," at the same
time sighing for similar counsels to sway" the other people of
the States and their rulers." The Tribune's Paris correspondent
calls frequent attention to the Southern sympathies of the upper
clergy. His testimony pales, however, before the regretful
admissions of the noble Montalembert whose great speech on the
"Triumph of the Union" lamented the Catholic opposition to a
government under whose flag Catholicism had made such progress "as no one has witnessed anywhere else since the first ages
of the Church."
The Roman Catholic press was not backward in its ridicule
of the party of Lincoln. La Patrie gave its readers quite a treat
in its graphic account of that annual celebration known to all
Republicans in which the party leaders solemnly burn the
Constitution "bequeathed to the nation by the founders of the
Republic.' ,
The Church was distinctly cautious. Its partisanship was
more the silent weight of disapproval than the active voice of
hostility. It could defend itself on one score where American
Protestantism was highly vulnerable. It had not been the active
apologist for and champion of slavery. Its very silence, however, required explanation when the march of events called for
real opinions stoutly upheld. Silence unbroken even to regret
the assassination of Lincoln was too great a phenomenon to pass
unnoticed. The Journal des Debats called for an explanation,
which was but lamely rendered by La Patrie. One distinguished
exception arises among the eighty or more Gallican prelates.
M. Dupanloup, Bishop of Orleans, grasped the deeper issues
of the struggle. In the Second Inaugural Address of Lincoln,
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he recognized a masterpiece, and by his comprehension of the
sublime loneliness of Lincoln, he established with the martyr
president a certain kinship of soul.
If truth be told, the passive opposition of the Church may
be easily overemphasized. Many Roman Catholics voted with
the Liberals, while many more were totally indifferent to a
question which had for them no vital relation. Whether because
of, or in spite of, ecclesiastical direction, the French as a nation
and a Catholic nation, too, maintained their traditional friendship
for the government at Washington.
However his subjects might sympathize and theorize,
Napoleon would finally dictate the national policy with a knowledge of conditions both North and South more accurate, perhaps,
than either combatant possessed. His special agent, M. Barrot,
and the usual consular service were at his disposal. The diplomatic correspondence with Seward, and the unofficial relations
with Benjamin, and the Confederate emissary, Slidell, set before
him the widest variances of opinion. His friend and dentist,
Dr. Evans, gave him the outlook of a loyal Northern man; his
friend and intimate, Slidell, constantly pointed out the righteousness of the Southern cause and its certainty of success. What
then would be the Emperor's attitude? He himself expressed
it in a nutshell: "Si Ie Nord est victorieuxje serai heureux, si Ie
Sud est victorieux je serai enchante." Napoleon's instinct was as
unerring as that of the most brilliant among his Liberal subjects.
Only his was not their point of view. The triumph of the Union
would vindicate Republican institutions; its failure would be
a moral victory for reaction, and a diplomatic victory for
Napoleon's Mexican plans.
Prejudice did not overcome discretion. Napoleon's official
relations were always correct. His dealings with the Confederacy
were unofficial and could give no technical cause for offence.
Napoleon may have promised Slidell an Anglo-French fleet to
break the blockade of the Mississippi, but the fleet was never
sent. He undoubtedly did offer an unsolicited mediation, but
this was never pressed. The interests of his dynasty were
paramount with Napoleon. Its continuance depended upon
prosperity at home and glory abroad. The American war
jeopardized the prosperity. The temptation to intervene was
founded upon economic necessity. But economic necessity
yielded before political prudence when England and Russia
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refused to co-operate. Glory, which was so indispensable to
Napoleonic traditions, seemed to combine with practical gain in
an expedition to Mexico which would embarrass both North and
South, would open an independent source of cotton supply, and
would flatter the vanity of Frenchmen as the principals in a
world-wide Latin Empire in which Napoleon might emulate his
uncle as a king maker.
The greatest weakness of Napoleon's administration was
its remoteness from reality. To the last he was a conspirator.
His reactionary policy toward the press alienated the sympathy
of Liberals. He did not draw toward the throne the real men of
the nation. In such a game the glory was his alone; equally his
was the responsibility. Had he recognized his own limitations
and built up a responsible ministry to carry out a Liberal policYt
his mistakes would have been fewer, his stability surer. The
role he elected to play demanded genius of the first order, and
genius he did not have.
Since he was powerless to intervene effectively, Napoleon
must have derived a good deal of satisfaction from the enterprise of Messrs. Armand and Voruz of Nantes in fitting out war
vessels "intended for the Pacific trade," a euphemism for the
Confederate navy. The impenal heart showed that it was in the
right place when in 1864, on the" fete of St. Napoleon," he promoted M. Armand to a commandership in the" Imperial Order
of the Legion of Honour." At the same time he awarded a gold
medal to the pilot, and silver medals to his assistants, of the boat
which had rescued twelve of the crew of the Alabama.
This decidedly moderate recognition of the Confederacy
was hardly to the taste of Slidell and his home government; but
the Richmond Sentinel credited Napoleon with a just comprehension of slavery and attributed his neutrality to the fear of doing
violence to the anti-slavery sentiment of his people." The
Sentinel was correct. The Liberals of France had held in leash
the inclinations of the Emperor.
A campaign of pUblicity preceded the Mexican expedition.
La France declared its purpose to be the enfranchisement of a
nation worthy of universal sympathy" and a warning to North
America, 'I You shall go no farther." Soundings were made as to
the feasibility of detaching Texas from the Confederacy. But in
view of the seventy Texas regiments in the Confederate Army,
success seemed unlikely. The plan as carried out involved the
II
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somewhat fantastic scheme of Latin triumph over Anglo-Saxons
in the glorious and disinterested service to Mexico of furnishing
her an Austrian emperor supported by French bayonets and gold.
From the outset difficulties multiplied. The public never felt
its Emperor's enthusiasm for the project, and suspicious souls
even called it "Duke Jecker's War," nothing but a piece of
gigantic brigandage to force Mexico to pay usurious interest on
the Jecker bonds supposed to have been bought up by the Duc
dp. Morny. Our Consul at Paris, John Bigelow, attributed the
move to Napoleon's desire to conciliate the Church of Rome and
the Emperor of Austria; but this view far from coincides with
Motley's. He describes the whole affair as intensely unpopular
with Austrians and embarrassing to the Government because
acceptance of the throne would mean a Hapsburg's vassalage
to Napoleon, while refusal thereof would incur his wrath.
Whether prompted by thirst for glory, or contempt for
our Monroe Doctrine, by friendship for Morny, or conciliation
toward Austria, Napoleon made the great mistake of his reign.
The Prussian War he did not want. Its folly was not his. The
Mexican fiasco was his own pet fancy. Its consequences be upon
his head! Diplomatically it was error one to misjudge the
North's ability to conquer the South and restate the Monroe
Doctrine. Historically, the lessons of Mexico's War for Independence should have taught Napoleon the futility of European
intervention in that land of revolution. Politically Napoleon
armed the Liberals with a constant object lesson of military
failure and budget deficits on which to sharpen their weapons of
satire.
This satire so rashly invited ranged from the delicate keenness of Montalembert-who found the Mexican venture "a
God-send to Europe; indeed, a God-send to France" because of
the still greater follies it had saved France from-to the coarse
bluntness of the pamphleteer's" and hasten the end of this ignominy which calls itself the Empire, of this monster who calls
himself the Emperor!"
The effect of the expedition upon French sentiment toward
us had one peculiar aspect. It crystallized and focused Liberal
sentiment, to be sure, but it constituted a source of irritation
with the United States which reminded the stoutest Liberal
that he was first of all a Frenchman. As the war drew toward
its close, the liveliest fears were felt that our enormous armies
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might be turned to Mexico for employment. The Marquis de
Boissy phrased a very logical French sentiment when he hoped
that North and South might be completely ruined rather than
that the French army in Mexico should be made prisoners by the
conclusion of the peace. The legislative body loudly disapproved,
but the sentiment had been uttered. It was not till June, 1865,
that the fear of war with the United States subsided. The
worst consequences of the ill-starred venture were thus avoided.
Enough mischief had been wrought as things were.
It seems a correct inference from the various points of view
which this paper has striven to present that the French people
were fundamentally true to their traditions toward America and
toward their own traditions of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity.
The test is in the facts. They did not mediate! they did not
intervene, they broke no blockade, and committed no overt act.
To expect unanimous sentiment would be preposterous. It
should be cause for permanent gratitude on the part of the
American people that in their hour of trial, the powers of Europe,
obedient to the intelligent liberal sentiment of the world, recognized the right of a Sovereign State to administer its own affairs.
LOUIS MARTIN SEARS.
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